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Abstract
A focused definition of present bias is proposed which takes preferences
as primitives. A present biased individual over-weights immediate costs
and benefits relative to those occurring at any point in the future. The
definition allows to sort out previous confounds, such as decreasing im-
patience, choice reversal or short-term impatience. It intuitively connects
to usual utility representations of present bias like the quasi-hyperbolic
model of Laibson (1997) or the fixed cost model of Benhabib, Bisin and
Schotter (2010).
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a rapid growth of theoretical and empirical
works on present bias. It is now considered an important determinant of many
intertemporal decisions related to saving or borrowing (Meier and Sprenger,
2010), retirement timing (Diamond and Koszegi, 2003), addiction (Laibson,
2001, Bernheim et Rangel, 2004), health (Loewenstein et al. 2012), bargaining
(Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2018), or job search (DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005).
It helps explain why individuals have self-control problems, procrastinate, or do
not stick to the plans they have made earlier (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2015,
Bisin and Hyndman, 2014).
It is fair however to recognize that the very idea of present bias still lacks
a formal definition. It has been used so far as a label for addressing various
behavioral properties like short-term impatience, decreasing impatience, choice
reversal toward early outcomes, and more generally, procrastination, self-control
problems, demand for commitment, high required rates of return and naiveté
(when people underestimate their own procrastination or present bias). The
profusion of concepts surrounding the term raises questions. Given the impor-
tance ascribed to the concept in the behavioral literature, a precise and well
founded definition is of prime importance.
The aim of this article is to propose a simple and focused definition of present
bias, which closely relates to, but remains distinct from choice reversal, decreas-
ing or increasing impatience and short-term impatience. A present biased indi-
vidual values more an immediate outcome than one postponed in the near future,
where the near future can be arbitrarily soon. The definition makes a natural
distinction between present bias, present neutrality and future bias. It takes a
simple axiomatic form, which, once mixed with other axioms of time preference
has the property of turning present neutral preferences into present or future
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biased ones. Two well known models of present bias, the quasi-hyperbolic model
of Laibson (1997) and the fixed cost model of Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter
(2010) conforms in an intuitive way to the definition.
The expression “present bias” is relatively recent. It can be traced back to
the article by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) who present it as “a more descrip-
tive term for the underlying human characteristic that hyperbolic discounting
represents”. Hyperbolic discounting is taken as an equivalent expression for de-
creasing impatience, which means that when considering trade-offs between two
future periods, individuals give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as
it gets closer. Decreasing impatience has since then served as a testable impli-
cation of present bias (e.g. Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). Subsequent studies
(Hayashi, 2003; Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter, 2010) have extended the mean-
ing to the preference reversal property, which is the tendency of reversing one’s
choice from late to early outcome once a trade-off is moved closer to the present
(Thaler, 1981; Read and van Leeuwen, 1998). More recently, O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2015) proposed as an alternative test of present bias the detection of non
negligible impatience over short delays.
Experimental studies show that a significant fraction of subjects exhibit op-
posite tendencies, like increasing impatience (Attema et al., 2010) or choice re-
versals toward the late outcome (Read, Frederick and Airoldi, 2012; Sayman and
Öncüler, 2009; Takeuchi, 2011), especially when the outcomes are money. While
it seems natural to refer to those properties as future bias, the same remark
about the need for a unified definition applies.
Many studies referring to present bias have worked with functional represen-
tations, usually the quasi-hyperbolic model of Laibson (1997), also called the
(β− δ)) model, where, compared to the exponential model of Samuelson (1937),
an extra weight 1/β on present utility is added. In his seminal article, Laibson
did not propose a specific theory of present bias, whose expression appeared later
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in his work (Laibson et al., 2003). His objective was rather to propose a time
inconsistent discounting model which exhibits decreasing impatience while being
closer to the canonical model of Samuelson (1937) than the hyperbolic formula-
tion used by psychologists (Ainslie, 1992). Since then, the model has served as a
workhorse to investigate the consequences of many behaviors like decreasing im-
patience, choice reversal, naiveté or short-term impatience. Although functional
forms offer tractable ways for analyzing a wide range of issues, they may lack
scope and generality (Spiegler, 2019).
A few articles give a conceptual or axiomatic definition of present bias.
Chakraborty (2017) weakens the stationarity axiom to allow possible choice re-
versals in a way that does not contradict a preference for the present. Mon-
tiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014) provide an axiomatic characterization of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting and a more general class of semi-hyperbolic preferences.
Both articles elaborate on present bias defined as a deviation from stationarity
and constant impatience.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out existing
definitions of present bias and proposes a new definition. Section 3 presents
axiomatic foundations of the definition. Section 4 concludes.
2 Present bias: definitions
2.1 Previous definitions
Present bias is loosely defined as the propensity of overvaluing immediate rewards
at the expense of futures ones. The tendency is often phrased as an extreme form
of impatience or a strong preference for early rather than late outcomes. A variety
of psychological drivers have been mentioned, such as impulsivity, deprivation,
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addiction, or transient visceral factors such as hunger or thirst.
More formally, let us consider a decision maker (henceforth DM) whose time
preferences are defined over the set of possible positive or negative outcomes
X ⊆ R − {0}. T = {0, 1, 2, ..., t¯} is the set of times at which an outcome may
occur, with t = 0 the present. A time-dependent plan (x, t) delivers the outcome
x ∈ X at date t ∈ T . Let the relations , ≺ and ∼ define complete and
transitive preference ordering on X × T expressed at time 0. Positive outcomes
(consumption in a broad sense) are defined by (x, t)  (y, t), ∀x, y ∈ X, x > y,
and ∀t ∈ T , and negative outcomes (unpleasant experience or tasks) by the
reverse preference. In the following, the set of dated outcomes is restricted
to either positive outcomes or negative ones. The issue of time-consistency is
sidestepped by focusing on time preferences from date 0 perspective, as if the
DM could commit to them.
Before presenting an axiom-based definition of present bias, I first recall the
definitions of decreasing impatience (Prelec, 2004) and choice reversal.
Definition 1 (decreasing impatience) ∀ x, y ∈ X, ∀ s, t ∈ T , s < t, such that
(x, s) ∼ (y, t), impatience is decreasing if (x, s + ∆) ≺ (y, t + ∆), for all ∆ > 0
and t+ ∆ ∈ T .
Impatience is decreasing (or discounting is hyperbolic) if for any couple of
equivalent dated outcomes, the DM prefers the delayed option when the two
dates are shifted forward by the same time interval. Increasing impatience is
defined the same way with a reversed preference relation between the early and
late outcomes.
Most experimental studies have found decreasing impatience (Thaler, 1981;
Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil, 1989; Green, Myerson and Mcfadden, 1997; Kirby,
1997; Kirby, Petry, and Bickel, 1999; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Benhabib, Bisin,
and Schotter, 2010; Bleichrodt, Gao, and Rohde, 2016). Some studies have found
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increasing impatience for money (Attema et al., 2010; Sayman and Öncüler, 2009;
Scholten and Read 2006; Loewenstein, 1987 and Takeuchi, 2011).
Many articles assimilate present bias and decreasing impatience (O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999; Halevy, 2008; Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter, 2010; Andreoni
and Sprenger, 2012). Present bias can be viewed as a particular instance of
decreasing impatience in which the early date is the present one (t = 0). However,
decreasing impatience, which characterizes the evolution of impatience at every
date, does not stress what is special about the present.
Decreasing impatience is a cause of time inconsistency and choice reversal.
For this reason, present bias is also sometimes assimilated to choice reversal
(Manzini and Mariotti, 2009; Chakraborty, 2017). Several experimental studies
use it as a test of present bias (Read and van Leeuwen, 1998, Takeuchi, 2011,
Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012, Augenblick et al., 2015). As a future trade-off gets
closer to the present, preferences are increasingly biased toward the early option.
Definition 2 (choice reversal) ∀ x, y ∈ X and ∀ s, t ∈ T , t < s, such that
(x, t) ∼ (y, s), there is choice reversal toward the early outcome if, t periods
later, (x, 0)  (y, s− t), and toward the late outcome if (x, 0) ≺ (y, s− t).
The definition of choice reversal toward the early outcome is close to the
definition of decreasing impatience, but requires the passage of time. Decreasing
impatience entails choice reversal towards the present outcome if preferences are
stable across periods (Halevy, 2015). Experiments usually find that choices are
reversed in favor of the present option for positive outcomes. Since choice reversal
toward the present option often reveals self-control problems and toward the late
outcome procrastination, present bias is also sometimes inferred from demand
for precommitment devices that restricts the set of future consumption or actions
(Bryan, Karlan and Nelson, 2010). The test relies on the joint assumption of
sophistication where the DM is sufficiently aware of her self control problem.
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Impatience over short-term trade-offs, a property commonly observed in ex-
periments, is also interpreted as signaling present bias (Rabin, 2002; Shapiro,
2005; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006). O’Donoghue and Rabin (2015) argue that
short-term discounting is a test of present bias, even better than choice reversal.
To see why, consider an exponential discounter whose discount rate over a short
period of time is ρ ≥ 0 and her short term discount factor is d(1) = (1 + ρ)−1.
Her utility in n years is discounted by d(nm) = (1 + ρ)−nm, with m the num-
ber of unit periods in a year. Her annualized discount factor ρa is equal to
1 + ρa = (1 + ρ)−m. Even a small level of short-term impatience may translate
into a potentially extreme degree of impatience once compounded over long pe-
riods of time. For instance, a tiny discount rate of ρ = 0.1 percent over one day
leads to a strong annualized discount rate of 44 percent. Such value seems incom-
patible with individuals engaging in profitable long-term investments like saving
for their long term standard of living. More reasonable long-term impatience is
consistent with short-term impatience once a bias for the present is accounted
for. This can be done with the two-parameter (β − δ) model of Laibson (1997)
where future utility is discounted exponentially (d(t) = (1 + ρ)−t) and an extra
weight d(0) = 1/β > 1 applies to present utility.
Although short-term impatience may reveal a bias toward the present, it is
not a clear-cut criterion. In particular, the issue of what constitutes excessive
impatience in a quantitative sense is not immune from judgment. O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2015) claim that any noticeable short-term discounting is evidence
of present bias. It may be true for very short delays like a day or a week, but
is less compelling for medium delays like a month. Also, the boundary between
excessive and plausible short-term impatience is a moving one, as it depends on
the time discounting model and the functional form at hand. For example, if
exponential discounting is replaced by constant absolute decreasing impatience
discounting (Bleichrodt, Rohde and Wakker, 2009): d(t) = exp(exp(−ct) − 1),
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the previous calibration exercise yields annualized long-term discount rates of
36, 30 and 18 percent at the horizons of 1, 2 and 5 years respectively, compared
to the fixed annual discount rate of 44 percent in the exponential model. They
are still high numbers, but less so than in the exponential case.
To sum up, short-term impatience, decreasing impatience and choice reversal
are all intuitively related to the notion of present bias. The link is however
informally established. The next subsection proposes a different approach based
on a novel definition of present bias.
2.2 Definition
Present bias is defined by including in the time set an additional period of du-
ration µ distinct from the present, but asymptotically close to it. The DM is
present biased if her preference satisfies Axiom 1.
Axiom 1 (present bias) (x, 0)  (x, 0+), ∀x ∈ X.
with the short notation 0+ = limµ→0+ µ. A present biased DM values more
an immediate outcome than one postponed in the near future, where the near
future can be as soon as desired. The definition applies both to positive and
negative outcomes. The Axiom stresses the specificity of the present, a point
on a timeline, and is consistent with the claim that present bias “is about now”
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2015). It is also close to the description of Volpp and
Loewenstein (2015) as the “tendency to over-weight immediate costs and benefits
relative to those occurring at any point in the future”. It does not necessarily
imply a strong appeal toward the immediate outcome relative to a postponed
outcome. The important ingredient is the temporal discontinuity between the
present and the future.
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Future bias can be symmetrically defined as a preference for the late outcome
in the near future, a special case of patience.
Axiom 2 (future bias) (x, 0+)  (x, 0), ∀x ∈ X.
Future bias may occur when the DM faces negatively valued outcomes like
unpleasant tasks, or when individuals derive a positive utility of anticipating a
pleasant consumption experience (Loewenstein, 1987, Shu and Gneezy, 2010).
The DM may also be willing to postpone a positive outcome to create an im-
proving sequence (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991). The expression future bias
has been used in the literature with a different. It stands either for increasing
impatience (Attema et al., 2010) or choice reversals toward the late outcome
(Read, Frederick and Airoldi, 2012; Sayman and Öncüler, 2009; Takeuchi, 2011).
Last, a DM is present neutral if she is time neutral around the present mo-
ment.
Axiom 3 (present neutrality) (x, 0) ∼ (x, 0+), ∀x ∈ X.
All individuals are characterized by one of the three attitudes toward imme-
diate outcomes. They can be used to classify usual models of discounting as
present biased or time neutral, and to provide axiomatic foundations to present
biased models.
3 Implications
3.1 Utility representation
Present bias is defined in a narrow sense by focusing on some minimal necessary
ingredients. Consequently, it does not impose a complete preference ordering of
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intertemporal plans. One may wonder how the definition fits with full-fledged
models of intertemporal choices. We have first to express Axiom 1 as a restriction
on discounted utilities. Let u(x, t) be the utility of x in t periods. The DM is
present biased if
u(x, 0) > u(x, 0+) (1)
where u(x, 0+) stands for limµ→0+ u(x, µ). The DM is future biased if the in-
equality is reversed, and present neutral if the condition is an equality.
All discounting models which do not give an extra weight to the immediate
outcome are present neutral. To illustrate, the exponential discount function
(Samuelson, 1937) d(t) = (1 + ρ)−t with ρ ∈ (0, 1) a subjective discount rate
defined over a unit period of time, is present neutral:
u(x, 0)− u(x, 0+) = u(x)
(
1− lim
µ→0+
(1 + µρ)−1
)
= 0
While the result is well known in the literature, the interpretation is novel.
Exponential discounting is present neutral because it is continuous in the neigh-
borhood of the present. The same analysis applies to the generalized model of
hyperbolic discounting of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), which nests as special
cases the models of Harvey (1986) and Mazur (1987).1 Although those models
satisfy the property of decreasing impatience, they are present neutral since the
discounting functions are smooth around the present. Discount functions in Ble-
ichrodt, Rohde and Wakker (2009) and Ebert and Prelec (2007) are also present
neutral for the same reason.
The discontinuity between the present and the future in (1) can be modeled
in several manners. It can take an additive form:
u(x, 0+) = u(x, 0)− τ(x) (2)
1The discounting function of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) is d(t) = (1 + ht)−r/h with
h ≥ 0 and r > 0. The model nests two special cases: proportional discounting (Mazur, 1987)
with h = r and power discounting (Harvey, 1986) with h = 1.
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with 0 < τ(x) < u(x, 0), ∀x ∈ X, or a multiplicative form:
u(x, 0+) = β(x)u(x, 0) (3)
with 0 < β(x) < 1, ∀x ∈ X. The higher τ(x) or the lower β(x), the stronger
the bias toward present utility. If discounted utility is time-separable: u(x, t) =
d(t)u(x), and given the normalization d(0+) = 1, the weight d(0) on present
utility can be interpreted as a present bias parameter. With an additive form, it
is
d(0) = u(x)
τ(x)
and with a multiplicative form:
d(0) = 1
β
A weight above 1 reflects a bias toward the present and below 1 toward
the future. The additive formulation is a key ingredient in Benhabib, Bisin,
and Schotter (2010) whose discounting model is u(x, 0) = u(x) and u(x, t) =
exp{−rt}u(x) − τ , t > 0. A bias toward the present is generated by a fixed
utility cost τ > 0 interpreted as the “psychological restraint from the impulse of
choosing the immediate reward”. The model has a jump discontinuity at date 0:
u(x, 0)− u(x, 0+) = u(x)− lim
µ→0+
exp{−rµ}u(x) + τ = τ > 0
which makes preference present biased according to Condition (1).
The multiplicative formulation is exemplified by the quasi-hyperbolic model
of Laibson (1997). Long-term impatience is driven by an exponential discounting
function: d(t) = (1 + ρ)−t, t > 0. Short-term impatience is affected by an extra
weight on present utility d(0) = 1/β > 1. The discounting function is also
present biased according to Condition (1):
u(x, 0)− u(x, 0+) = u(x)
(
1/β − lim
µ→0+
(1 + µρ)−1
)
= (1/β − 1)u(x) > 0
with 1/β − 1 a measure of the bias.
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3.2 Axiomatic inclusion
Axiom 1 of present bias and Axiom 2 of future bias can mix with consistent
sets of axioms, changing present neutral preferences into present biased or future
biased preferences.2 Any axiom-based preference relations become present biased
once Axiom 1 is added to the set of axioms:
Proposition 1 Let us consider a preference relation (A,∼A) over X×{0, 1, ..., t¯},
complete, transitive, present neutral, and satisfying a set A of axioms.
1. There exists a preference relation (B,∼B), complete and transitive, over
X × {0, 0+, 1, ..., t¯} satisfying all axioms in A over X × {0+, 1, ..., t¯} and
Axiom 1 over X × {0, 0+}.
2. (x, t) ∼A (y, s) ∀x, y ∈ X and t, s > 0 ⇒ (x, t) ∼B (y, s)
3. (x, 0) ∼A (y, s) ∀x, y ∈ X and s > 0 ⇒ (x, 0) B (y, s)
Proof 1. Since (A,∼A) is complete and transitive over X × {0, 1, ..., t¯}, so
it is over the modified time set {0+, 1, ..., t¯}, where immediate outcomes
are replaced by asymptotically immediate outcomes. Present neutrality
preserves all orderings: (x, 0) ∼ (y, s) ⇐⇒ (x, 0+) ∼ (y, s). The relation
(B,∼B) is complete over X × {0, 0+, 1, ..., t¯} as (A,∼A) is complete
over X × {0+, 1, ..., t¯} and Axiom 1 implies (x, 0) B (x, 0+) and therefore
(x, 0) B (x, s) ∀s > 0. It is transitive over X × {0, 0+, 1, ..., t¯} since
(A,∼A) is transitive over X × {0+, 1, ..., t¯} and (x, 0) B (x, 0+) plus
(x, 0+) B (x, s), ∀s > 0, implies (x, 0) B (x, s).
2. Straightforward since (B,∼B) satisfies all axioms in A over {0+, 1, ..., t¯}.
2 The analysis focuses on present bias, but a symmetric reasoning would apply to the case
of future bias.
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3. (x, 0) ∼A (y, s) over X × {0, 1, ..., t¯} implies (x, 0+) ∼A (y, s) over X ×
{0+, 1, ..., t¯} due to present neutrality. Since (B,∼B) ranks dated out-
comes over X × {0+, 1, ..., t¯} the same way than (A,∼A), this implies
(x, 0+) ∼B (y, s) over the same domain. Axiom 1 implies in turn (x, 0) B
(y, s). 
The relation (B,∼B) replicates the ordering of (A,∼A) except when one
of the two compared outcomes is obtained immediately. Since a present neutral
DM identically values an immediate outcome and an asymptotically immediate
one, the axioms in A equivalently apply on a modified time set where “now” is
replaced by “next moment”. Present outcomes are then ordered relative to other
dated outcomes thanks to Axiom 1.
Proposition 1 implies that any axiom-based preference relations can display
present bias once Axiom 1 is included. Furthermore, if all future outcomes are
identically valued under the relations (A,∼A) and (B,∼B), then a present
outcome is more valued with Axiom 1 than without:
Proposition 2 Let us assume that the complete, transitive and present neutral
preference relation (A,∼A) over X ×{0, 1, ..., t¯} is represented by a continuous
real-valued function u(x, t) such that (x, t) A (y, s) ⇔ u(x, t) > u(y, s). There
exists a continuous real-valued function v(x, t) on X×{0, 0+, 1, ..., t¯} representing
the relation (B,∼B) and characterized by:
1. v(x, t) = u(x, t), ∀x ∈ X and t ∈ {0+, 1, ..., t¯},
2. v(x, 0) > u(x, 0) ∀x ∈ X.
Proof 1. Straightforward, since the preference relation (B,∼B) ranks dated
outcomes over T − {0}+ {0+} the same way than (A,∼A).
13
2. u(x, 0+) = v(x, 0+) ∀x ∈ X (claim 1). Since u(x, 0+) = u(x, 0) due to
present neutrality and v(x, 0+) < v(x, 0) due to present bias, claim 2.
obtains. 
Present bias can be interpreted as a psychological drive that weakly inter-
acts with other behavioral properties like decreasing impatience. Its ability to
mix with other axioms makes possible a simple and transparent axiomatization
of present biased preferences. As an illustration, let us start from the set of
axioms posed in Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) which utility representation
is consistent with exponential discounting. They demonstrate that a set of ax-
ioms (weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity and stationarity) guarantees the
existence of a real scalar δ such that the ordering can be represented by the
function u(x, t) = δtu(x) up to a positive and multiplicative factor. Proposition
2 can be applied on top of this result. The time set is expanded by the inclu-
sion of the date 0+. The axioms of Fishburn and Rubinstein and the resulting
present neutral functional form u hold for the modified time set {0+, 1, 2, ..., t¯}.
The addition of Axiom 1 in the set of axioms changes utility u from present
neutral to present biased: v(x, t) = u(x, t) = δtu(x) ∀t ∈ {0+, 1, 2, ..., t¯} and
v(x, 0) > v(x, 0+) = u(x). v(x, 0) can then take the additive formulation (2) or
the multiplicative formulation (3).
3.3 Behavioral implications
The definition of present bias allows a sharp distinction with several behavioral
properties often interpreted as a unique phenomenon in the literature: decreasing
impatience, choice reversal and short-term impatience.
We saw in Proposition 1 that any consistent set of axioms defining a weak
order are compatible with Axiom 1, once defined over the expanded time set
{0, 0+, 1, 2, ..., t¯}. Those preferences may be characterized either by decreasing,
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constant or increasing impatience, regardless of the presence of present or future
bias over the time set {0, 0+}. Experimental studies which test whether subjects
are increasingly or decreasingly impatient do not test present bias defined by
Axiom 1.
Present bias is related to the definition of decreasing impatience in the fol-
lowing way. Let us pose a modified definition of decreasing impatience:
Definition 3 (decreasing impatience) ∀ x, y ∈ X, ∀ t ∈ T , such that (x, 0) ∼
(y, t), impatience is decreasing if (x,∆) ≺ (y, t+ ∆), ∀∆ > 0.
The definition is the same as Definition 1 except that the early date is the
present and the delay ∆ may take any real positive values instead of only discrete
time intervals.
Proposition 3 Definition 3 of decreasing impatience implies Axiom 1 of present
bias.
Proof Definition 3 holds for ∆ as small as desired: (x, 0+) ≺ (y, t+). If (y, t+) ∼
(y, t) or (y, t+) ≺ (y, t), then (x, 0+) ≺ (y, t) ∼ (x, 0). 
A preference relation is present biased according to Axiom 1 if it is decreas-
ingly impatient according to Definition 3. The proof relies on the exclusion
of future bias for delayed trade-offs. Preferences can be either “future present
neutral” ((y, t) ∼ (y, t+), ∀ t > 0) or “future present biased” ((y, t)  (y, t+),
∀ t > 0), but cannot be “future future biased” ((y, t) ≺ (y, t+), ∀ t > 0). Con-
versely, present bias does not imply decreasing impatience since the delay ∆ may
span larger intervals of time. In this sense, the definition of present bias is weaker
than the definition of decreasing impatience.
Likewise, present bias does not necessarily imply choice reversal toward the
immediate outcome, even if preferences are stationary. Following Definition 2
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of choice reversal, suppose the outcomes (x, t) and (y, s), t < s, are equivalent
from date 0 perspective, or u(x, t) = u(y, s). t periods later, when the early
outcome is available now, the DM choice is tilted toward the immediate option
if u(x, 0)− u(y, s− t) > 0 or if:(
u(x, 0)− u(x, 0+)
)
+
(
u(x, 0+)− u(y, s− t)
)
> 0
The choice is reversed if the DM preferences satisfy both present bias (the
first difference is positive) and decreasing impatience (the second difference is
positive). Yet, if time preferences are characterized by increasing impatience
(the second difference is negative), present bias could well be associated with
preference reversal toward the late outcome. A corollary is that the definition
of present bias is insensitive to the delicate issue of whether individuals choose
naively (they do not foresee their self control problems) or in a more sophisticated
way (they foresee them, at least partially).
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006, 2015) define present bias as short-term im-
patience where “short” means any durations which, which once exponentially
compounded over longer time intervals imply implausible impatience. Present
bias defined here as impatience over vanishingly small time intervals, is close in
spirit to theirs with however notable differences: it can be formally stated, de-
fines future bias symmetrically, does not rely on model-dependent consequences
for long-run impatience, and allows to sort out truly present biased discount
functions from others ones.
4 Conclusion
How concepts are defined influences the way researchers frame their reasoning
and build new knowledge. Sound and operational definitions facilitate scientific
progress and open new directions for research. This article argues that a focused
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definition of present bias is missing in the literature. The concept is either
confounded with its behavioral implications, like decreasing impatience or choice
reversal, or identified to functional forms, principally the (β−δ) model of Laibson
(1997).
The definition of present bias, a strict preference for immediate outcomes
over ones postponed in the arbitrarily near future, has affinities with, yet is
distinct from behaviors previously associated with the concept. Individual may
be present biased and not decreasingly impatient with regards to immediate
or future trade-offs. As time elapses, they may not necessarily reverse their
choice toward the immediate outcome, even if their preferences are stationary.
The definition takes a simple axiomatic form and discriminates between models
commonly associated with present bias. The (β − δ) model of Laibson (1997)
and the fixed cost model of Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010) satisfy the
definition, while the generalized model of hyperbolic discounting of Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992) or the discount functions of Bleichrodt, Rohde and Wakker
(2009) and Ebert and Prelec (2007) do not.
The paper proposes an intuitive axiomatic framework in which the elicitation
of present bias is agnostic about preferences over delayed trade-offs, and as a
result not tied to a specific functional form. The definition suggests new ways of
measuring present bias. Most experiments estimate a (β−δ) model by collecting
data on multiple types of choices, some involving trade-offs between immediate
utility and future utility, and others involving trade-offs between future utilities
at different dates. A simpler measure consistent with the present definition would
elicit the discount parameter over short periods of time, an empirical strategy
recently followed by Augenblick (2018) for unpleasant tasks.
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